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In today's ever-advancing information age, technology is facilitating access to information.' The combination of "Moore's Law," 2 the information superhighway,3 and the $1000 personal compute? puts vast

amounts of knowledge at the fingertips of millions of people across the
United States.5 With this high-tech information revolution have come
those who have gained financially from it, or perhaps conversely, those
seeking to gain financially from this revolution have been the driving
force behind it. Whichever the case, one thing is certain-electronic in-

formation has been a very lucrative endeavor for all players.6 From
1. The use of personal computers permits instant access to volumes of case law and statutes
for legal research, instantly updated stock quotes, breaking news headlines, and updates on a
sports score from one's home or office.
2. 'Moore's Law" is named after Gordon Moore, co-founder of Intel Corp., who first proposed that the microchips which power computers get twice as smart every 18 months. See 20013000: The World As It Will Be, LFE, Oct. 15, 1997, at 168, 168. The microchips found in today's
computers are over 130,000 times smarter than when the chips were first introduced in 1971. See
id. According to Paul Horn, Senior Vice President of Research at International Business Machines
("IBM"), Moore's Law will apply for at least 15 more years. See id. By then, computers will be
1000 times more powerful than those we use today, and 130 million times more powerful than the
first microchip. See id.
3. "The Information Superhighway: A popular term used ... to describe a vision of a world
wide communications network, akin to what the Internet is today." Ian C. Ballon, Intellectual
Property Protection and Related Third Party Liability, in 1 FIRST ANNUAL INTERNET LAW INSTrtrE 559, 565 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Property Course Handbook
Series No. G-482, 1997).
4. The under $1000 personal computer has been called the big technology success of 1997.
See David Lieberman, Media Experts FallShort in Predictionsfor 1997, USA TODAY, Dec. 30,
1997, at 4B. However, early 1998 has already seen the unveiling of the under $800 personal computer by Hewlett-Packard Co., using the latest computer chip technology. See Jim Carlton, Hewlett-Packardto Unveil Sub-$800 PCs Using Intel's Latest MMX Technology, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 5,
1998, at B6.
5. Researchers estimate that there are 40 to 50 million people online around the world. See
Short Cuts: Subscriber Surge, NEwSDAY (Long Island, N.Y.), Nov. 18, 1997, at A56. America
Online, the largest online service in the United States, has more than 10 million subscribers. See
id. A recent study by IntelliQuest Information Group Inc. stated that more than 62 million United
States adults went online in the fourth quarter of 1997. See Bill Pietrucha, Study Puts U.S. Online
Populationat 62 Million, NEwsBYTs, Feb. 6, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws
File. Sixty-two million United States adults represents 30% of the United States population age 16
or older and was an increase of one third from the 46.8 million users reported for the same period
in 1996. See id. Two trends suggest that the financial potential of Intemet-related products and
services is great: (1) if the current user growth continues, the number of United States residents
wired to the Internet could approach 70 million by mid-1998; and (2) the 1997 fourth quarter statistics marked, for the first time, that Intemet-online users accounted for more than half of computer users. See id.
6. A November 1988 article in Folio magazine claimed that Time received a $500,000 advance against royalties for putting its articles on America Online. See Julius J. Marke, Protection
of ElectronicPublicationRights, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 17, 1995, at 5. Newsweek struck a similar deal
with Prodigy. See id.
It is important to note that these figures do not reflect payments to the publications for bringing new subscribers to the service, or for continuing royalty payment as a result of
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companies creating Internet software, to online service providers, to legal research databases, money-making opportunities do, and will continue to, exist.7

This combination of technology, information, and money has set
the battlefield for a war between freelance authors and publishers of
traditional print publications, such as newspapers and magazines, over
the reproduction of their periodicals via electronic media.8 The issues
which have come to the forefront include: (1) whether publishers own
the copyright in the works of these freelance authors via the publishers'
copyright in their compilations, or whether publishers have to first obtain permission from the authors before proceeding on the information
superhighway; and (2) whether publishers are required to pay royalties
to these authors for the use of their work on electronic media.9
On August 13, 1997, Judge Sonia Sotomayor handed down a ruling
in the much anticipated' Tasini v. New York Times Co." case addressing
these two issues. Judge Sotomayor held, inter alia, that publishers could
put their periodicals on electronic databases without the permission of,
or payment of royalties to, freelance writers whose works are included
in these publications. 2 The Tasini ruling, a conceded victory for publishers, 3 appears to be only the first battle of this war. 4 It also provides
actual online use of articles. See id. In 1992, 43.5 million searches were run on LEXIS and NEXIS.
See Carolina Saez, Enforcing Copyrights in the Age of Multimedia, 21 RUTGERS COMPuTER &
TECH. L.J. 351, 376 (1995) (citing John Verity, And Now, the Information Superlawsuit, Bus.
WK., Jan. 10, 1994, at 48). These searches generated approximately $494 million in revenues. See
id. (citing Jay Mathews, Writers Sue on Story Use by DataServices, WASH. PosT, Dec. 17, 1993,
at C3). "Electronic commerce, on-line publications and database services, generated an estimated
$1.1 billion in revenues in 1996, compared with $500 million the previous year."
Claudia MacLachlan, Don't Touch Internet Tax, City, State Say: Publishers Lobby for Moratorium; Millions at Stake, CRAIN'S CIR. BUS., Jan. 5, 1998, at 4.
7. See MacLachlan, supra note 6, at 4. According to congressional figures, Internet access
services such as Virginia-based America Online generated $2.4 billion in revenues in 1996. See id.
8. "[T]he battle is, at its heart, about money-who's going to get it someday and who's
going to be left in the cold." Christina Ianzito, Who Owns that Online Story?, COLUM. JOURNALISM REv., May/June 1997, at 15, 15.
9. See Carol Ebbinghouse, Side Bar: Who Gets the Money?, SEARCHER, Mar. 1996, at 51;
Jeff Garigliano, FirstRound in E-Rights Case Goes to Publishers,FOLIO, Sept. 15, 1997, at 12,
12; Chris Kineade, Rights Ripoff?: Writer Fights Back, VILLAGE VOICE (New York, N.Y.), June
24, 1997, at 30; David J. Wittenstein, Obtain Copyright Clearancefor Third-PartyMaterial on
Web Sites, MIN'S NEW MEDIA REP., Aug. 18, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 7968773.
10. See David J. Loundy, Electronic Database Providers Collect Court Decisions, Cmi.
DAILY L. BuLL., Oct. 9, 1997, at 6.
11. 972 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
12. See id. at 806.
13. See David Noack, PublishersI Freelancers0: FederalJudge Rules Against Freelancers
in Narrow Decision in Electronic Copyrights Test Case, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Aug. 23, 1997, at
7; Frances A. McMorris, Publishers Win Ruling on Putting Freelance Writers' Work On-Line,
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an opportunity to examine the players in this dispute, the dispute itself,
the ammunition used by both sides in asserting their respective positions, and how the courts have handled similar disputes in the past.
This Note examines the current controversy over "new-use" 5 electronic publishing, and proposes that the adoption of what is currently the
minority view of new-use analysis is a more equitable and efficient way
to advance the purposes of copyright and the goals of all parties affected
by copyright. Part I briefly examines the purpose of copyright from its
constitutional basis to its codification under federal law. This section
also examines the parties affected by copyright, what role each plays in
furthering the purpose of copyright, and how the copyright law attempts
to balance the interests of these parties. Part II compares the approaches
taken by courts in analyzing new-use controversies over the past century. Part III summarizes the current new-use controversy embodied in
Tasini, and analyzes the court's holding in light of whether it furthers
the purpose of copyright. Part IV applies the strict approach of new-use
analysis to the Tasini case, and asserts that the adoption of this approach
more equitably serves the purpose of copyright and advances the interests of authors, publishers, and users of electronic media. Part V examines Tasini's effects on the parties to the controversy, takes a brief look
at the future of online publishing as a new-use legal problem, and examines possible remedies to the dispute between publishers and freelance
authors.
I.

PURPOSE OF COPYRIGHT

"A copyright is a property right in an original work of authorship
that is fixed in tangible form."'" Copyright protection is available for
original works of authorship included in the following categories: "(1)

Dow JONES NEWS SERV., Aug. 13, 1997, available in Westlaw, Allnews Library, Nynews File;
Wittenstein, supra note 9. Despite a dismissal of his suit, Jonathan Tasini, President of the National Writers Union, commented: "'We won on every major point argued in the suit, and the case
finally turned on an Alice in Wonderland interpretation."' Calvin Reid, Tasini Looks to Appeal
CopyrightRuling, Lobby Congress,PUmIUSHERS WKLY, Sept. 1, 1997, at 10, 10.
14. See Garigliano, supra note 9, at 12. In an interview with Publishers Weekly, Jonathan
Tasini said: "'We're confident we will win an appeal....' Reid, supra note 13, at 10.
15. The term "new-use" is used in this Note to describe particular media technology which,
at its introduction to the public, creates a new property right to display a copyrighted work in the
new medium. See generally Sidney A. Rosenzweig, Comment, Don't Put My Article Online!: Extending Copyright's New-Use Doctrine to the Electronic Publishing Media and Beyond, 143 U.

PA. L. REV. 899, 910 (1995) (commenting that courts are forced "to grapple with whether licenses
for these new media were granted along with those for the preexisting media").
16. FRANKH.ANDORKA, WHATISACoPYRIGrr? 1 (1992).
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literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works." 7 Though extending to works in
all of these categories, copyright protection does not "extend to any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."' 8
Deciphering the purpose of copyright requires a more extended
discussion. Congress derives the authority to create copyright laws from
the United States Constitution's copyright clause. 9 Article I, section 8,
clause 8 states: "The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries .... ,20 Congress passed the first federal copyright
statute in 1790.21 Since then, the copyright laws have undergone a number of revisions, with the last major revision embodied in the Copyright
Act of 1976, which became effective on January 1, 1978.2 In determining the underlying purpose of copyright law, we must look at the parties
affected by it. The three parties whose interests are directly affected by
copyright law are authors, distributors (including publishers), and consumers (users).2 Members of these three groups all use copyright and
copyrighted materials for different purposes.
Authors' views on the purpose of copyright have led to misconceptions as to what copyright's true purpose is.N Due to the notions of
copyright forwarded by authors, copyright is generally seen as a means
to protect authors from those who would steal their work and use it for

17. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
18. Id.
19. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
20. Id. The 1710 Statute of Anne is the direct predecessor of American copyright law. See L.
RAY PATIERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS'

RIGHTS 47 (1991). The Statute of Anne identified the fundamental ideas of limited times of copyright for authors and the use of copyright for the encouragement of learning. See id.
21. See ANDORKA, supranote 16, at 1; PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supranote 20, at 47.
22. See ANDORKA, supra note 16, at 1.
23. See PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 20, at xi.
24. See id. at 1-2. A misconception about the purpose of copyright is seen in a quote by
Jonathan Tasini: "That is what copyright is all about-preserving independent, vital and diverse
voices in American journalism and American culture." National Vriters Union, Writers Consider
Action in Wake of CopyrightLawsuit Decision, M2 PRESSwRE, Aug. 15, 1997, available in 1997
WL 13652192.
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profit." Though the protection of authors from those who seek to use

their work for their own profit is an incidental function of copyright,
that is not its stated purpose. For authors, the protection of copyright
provides a monetary incentive to create new works. Authors thereby
view and use copyright as a creative catalyst.
For publishers, copyright is used as a means to disseminate their

works in a commercial setting. Publishers enter a protective environment where they may disseminate works and profit without fear of others copying their publications. Publishers thereby profit while acting as
intermediaries in the promotion of authors' works, and also as providers
of information to those seeking information (copyright users)." By obtaining copyright in their compilations and other works, publishers are
able to profit. More importantly, this opportunity for profit provides the
incentive for publishers to experiment with new technologies in order to
further the spread of information.
As a result, users gain the benefit of easy access to information. It
is the main interest of users that they have easy, low-cost access to a
wide range of information6 Users include researchers, students, libraries, and even other authors. Authors themselves see the merits of keeping the free-flow of information constant, since they often use other
copyrighted materials for the research of their own works.29 Users are

25. See PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 20, at 2. "'The primary purpose of copyright
law is to protect authors against those who would pilfer their work."' Id. (citing David A. Kaplan,
The End of History?, NEWSwEEK, Dec. 25, 1989, at 80).
26. See iL
"The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's'
creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity
for the general public good. 'The sole interest of the United States and the primary objective in conferring the monopoly,' this court has said, 'lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors."'
DONALD F. JOHNSTON, COPYRIGHT HANDBOOK 3 (2d ed. 1982) (quoting Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).
27. "[Copyright] acts as an incentive for others to invest in the dissemination and exploitation of works for the ultimate benefit of the public." GILLIAN DAvIEs, COPYRIGHT AND THE
PuBLic I'rEREsT 173 (1994).
28. "[Tihe interest of the public, in the sense of the user or consumer,... [is] in obtaining
access as cheaply and easily as possible to information of all kinds." Id. at 173-74. Some extreme
Internet enthusiasts and digital age philosophers propose that the Internet should be a medium
where allcopyright ceases to exist and all information on it will be free. See Jonathan Tasini, No
Such Thing as a Free Byte?: Cutting Through the "Info Should Be Free" Debate (visited Nov. 9,
1997) <http:llwww.lra-ny.com/workinglife/freebyte.html>.
29. Writers are not waging this battle over electronic rights in order to make obtaining information more difficult for researchers and curious Internet users. See Ebbinghouse, supra note 9,
at 54. The concern is over "'those who are systematically marketing and profiting from the unauthorized and uncompensated reuse of the writers' works."' Id.
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also concerned with the quality of information to which they have access. If authors are being shut out from the profit end of copyright, then
many authors will just pick up and leave, subsequently filling the information superhighway with sub-par material.
Clearly, the interests of authors, publishers, and users are intertwined. Copyright law must aim at finding the difficult level of balance
between the three parties, while continuing to forward its stated purpose
of the promotion of the public welfare by the advancement of knowledge.3 However balanced, we must always evaluate laws and court decisions purporting to enforce and further the purpose of copyright
against the purpose of copyright stated in the United States Constitution,
and not the purpose of copyright as defined by each of the interested
parties.32 If we do not, the delicate balance necessary for the proper
function of the system of copyright will be undone, and the relationship
between the parties will breakdown and cease to function.
II.

Two CASE LAW APPROACHES TO NEW-USE
CONTROVERSIES IN COPYRIGHT

The new-use controversy has dogged copyright law and the courts
which have tried to balance the rights of authors, publishers, and users,
for more than a century.3 Since the beginning of copyright law in England, copyright laws have been created, and subsequently amended, to
accommodate new-uses as technology provided public access to them. 4
In the United States, technology and copyright have also grown in parallel fashion. In 1802, America revised its copyright law to extend to mu-

30. Carol Ebbinghouse asserts that if publishers continue to deprive authors from a piece of
the profit from electronic versions of their work, authors will "ultimately take their works and go
home." Id. at 51. "The best freelancers may go elsewhere. Pages will still be filled, but increasingly by second-choice contributors. The franchise will lose some of its intrinsic value." Claire
Safran, Whose Workls ItAnyway?, FOLIO, Sept. 15, 1997, at 51, 51.
31. One commentator has stated that:
"Copyright properly understood and wisely handled may be at the same time a powerful stimulus to creation and the means of opening the channels of dissemination of
thought, information and debate. Misunderstood, and with its true purposes lost sight
of, copyright can become a limitation on creation and a barrier to free interchange and
expression."
DAVIES, supra note 27, at 139 (quoting Luther H. Evans, Copyright and the Public Interest, 53

BULL. OFTHE N.Y. PUB. LmR. 4 (1949)).
32. See PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 20, at 2.
33. See Elizabeth Atwood Galley, Who Owns Digital Rights?: Examining the Scope of
CopyrightProtectionfor ElectronicallyDistributedWorks, 18 CoMM. &THE LAW 3,3 (1996).
34. See i The first English copyright statute was passed in 1709, after mass copying and
distribution of authors' works followed the invention of the printing press. See id.
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sical compositions; in 1831, to include prints; in 1856, to protect dramas; in 1865, to cover photographs; in 1870, to encompass works of art;
and then again in the last major overhaul of copyright law in 1976, to
include radio, film, television, audio recorders, and home video.35 Because Congress has historically been slow to establish statutory law to
accommodate new technologies, 6 a number of cases have been decided
at the introduction of each new media to the public?7 This case law has
established two clear approaches to analyzing new-use controversies."
Professor Melville Nimmer, in what is regarded as the leading treatise
35. See id.
36. See id.; Saez, supra note 6, at 372.
37. These new-uses have included silent movies, talking motion pictures ("talkies"), television, and videocassettes. See, e.g., Manners v. Morosco, 252 U.S. 317, 327 (1920) (granting an
injunction against the representation of a play in moving silent pictures); SubaflIms, Ltd. v. MGMPathe Communications Co., Nos. 91-56248, 91-56379, and 91-56289, 1993 WL 39269, at *4 (9th
Cir. Feb. 17, 1993) (finding that the uncontracted-for videotape distribution of a movie infringed
on the licensor's copyright); Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150, 155 (2d Cir.
1968) (holding that an assignment of the rights to exhibit motion pictures of a copyrighted play
included the right to televise the motion picture); Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 229
F.2d 481, 487-93 (3d Cir. 1956) (finding television stations liable for damages for broadcasting an
old motion picture of a boxing match without the consent of one of the fighters); Murphy v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 112 F.2d 746, 747-48 (9th Cir. 1940) (holding that a transfer of motionpicture rights in a copyrighted play includes the right to produce talking motion pictures); L.C.
Page & Co. v. Fox Film Corp., 83 F.2d 196, 199 (2d Cir. 1936) (finding that exclusive movingpicture rights granted by an author in her book included the rights to produce talking motion pictures, although the latter medium was unknown at the time the agreement was executed); Brown v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 799 F. Supp. 166, 171-72 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding that an
agreement between a musical entertainer and a television producer that allowed the reproduction
of the entertainer's performance on a television show extended to reproduction of the performance
on film, videocassette, and videodisc); Platinum Record Co. v. Lucasfilm, Ltd., 566 F. Supp. 226,
227-28 (D.NJ. 1983) (holding that an agreement allowing the use of copyrighted songs in a motion picture, also permitted their use on a videocassette of the motion picture based upon language
of the agreement which gave reproduction rights in "any means or methods now or hereafter
known"); Landon v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 384 F. Supp. 450, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(holding that a copyright holder's sole and exclusive grant to a film corporation to use a book included the right to broadcast the motion picture version of the book on television and videocassettes); Harper Bros. v. Kaw, 232 F. 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (finding an implied negative covenant that prevented both the licensor and licensee of a copyright in a play from representing the
play in silent motion pictures); Frohman v. Fitch, 149 N.Y.S. 633, 634 (App. Div. 1914) (finding
that a grant of rights to a play did not permit its production as a silent motion picture because neither party contemplated such rights when the agreement was made); Cinema Corp. of Am. v. De
Mille, 267 N.Y.S. 327, 327-28 (Sup. Ct. 1933), aff'd, 267 N.Y.S. 959 (App. Div. 1933)
(concluding that an author who, by his own conduct, had divested himself of all property in a
story, had also transferred talking motion picture rights, although talking motion pictures were
unknown at the time the agreement was executed); Lipzin v. Gordin, 166 N.Y.S. 792, 793 (Sup.
Ct. 1915) (holding that an exclusive license to produce a play carried with it the right to produce a
silent motion picture as well).
38. See Saez, supra note 6, at 359-69; Mark F. Radcliffe, Old Property,LEGAL TIMES, Dec.
11, 1995, at 39.
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on copyright, 39 has labeled the two approaches as the preferred and the
strict approach. 4 When the federal copyright statutes have not covered a
particular technology, courts have relied on Nimmer's approaches, the
relevant contract provisions, contractual agreements specifying any
transfer of rights, and other evidence which may help to determine the
intent of the parties; industry custom and usage; and any analogous case
law addressing the4 use of old content in new media in order to decide
copyright disputes. 1
A.

The PreferredApproach

When using the preferred approach, a court will extend rights to a
new-use if that use can "reasonably" be said to fall within the
"ambiguous penumbra" of a medium explicitly set out in the agreement. 42 The defining premise of this broad-rights approach presumes
that rights have been extended to include the new medium if ambiguity
is present in the original agreement transferring rights to the work from
the creator to the second party. 43
Several jurisdictions have adopted Nimmer's preferred approach.'
The Second Circuit clearly illustrates their use of this approach in
Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.45 In Bartsch, the issue presented
to the Second Circuit was whether the assignment of the right "'to
copyright, vend, license and exhibit such motion picture photoplays
throughout the world"' was a broad enough assignment to include the
right to broadcast the motion picture on television without a further
grant by the copyright owner.4 The assignment discussed was executed
in 1930, nearly ten years prior to the commercial use of television.47 The
court held that the assignment terms were broad enough to encompass
the right to exhibit the play by television broadcast. 4" In coming to this
39. See Radcliffe, supra note 38, at 39.
40.

See 3 MELVILLE B. NImvIER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.10(B), at

10-90 to 10-91 (1998).
41. See Gailey, supranote 33, at 14.
42. See MNIMER
& NIMMER, supra note 40, at 10-91.
43. See id.
44. See Joanne Benoit Nakos, Comment, An Analysis of the Effect of New Technology on the
Rights Conveyed by Copyright License Agreements, 25 CUMB. L. REV. 433, 444 n.53 (1995)
(citing several jurisdictions which have adopted the preferred approach, including, but not limited
to, the First Circuit, D.C. Circuit, Southern District of New York, and a lower trial court in New
York).
45. 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1968).
46. Id. at 153 (quoting the agreement entered into by the parties).
47. See Radcliffe, supra note 38, at 40.
48. See Bartsch,391 F.2d at 153-55.
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conclusion, the court took note that the use of television as a medium
was not totally unknown at the time of the assignment.49 Since the contract was itself ambiguous as to the television rights, the court also attempted to examine the intent of the parties. The court failed in that
task, however, since at the time of the suit, Bartsch and his grantors
were dead, and the Warner Brothers5 ° lawyer had no recollection of the
negotiation. The court, therefore, used Professor Nimmer's two approach analysis in its effort to decipher the contract language. The court
subsequently chose Nimmer's preferred approach requiring a broad
construction of the rights.5
In Rooney v. Columbia PicturesIndustries,Inc.,5" the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York decided a class action suit brought by Mickey Rooney on behalf of himself and other performers of films produced by the defendants. 3 Rooney argued that the
defendants acquired only the rights to exhibit these performances in
movie theaters, and not on television or via videocassettes.5 4 Again, the
broad construction approach was utilized, since explicit rights were not
granted in the agreement. The court found that defendants had obtained
the rights to television exhibition because the contract provided for "'all
rights of every kind and character whatsoever' in the exploitation of the
photoplay"'55 Regarding Rooney's claim that defendants' rights to
"exhibit" the movies on television did not include the "'sale' of the
films by videocassettes and videodiscs,"56 the court concurred with the
defendants' position that "whether the exhibition apparatus is a home
videocassette player or a television station's broadcast transmitter, the
films are 'exhibited' as images on home television screens. 5 7
In a more recent case, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York again subscribed to Nimmer's preferred

49. See id. at 154. This point was central to the court distinguishing Bartsch from an earlier
case in which the copyright owner, who was not a sophisticated businessman, had no way of
knowing the possibility of the new-use (talking pictures). See id. (citing Kirke La Shelle Co. v.
Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163 (N.Y. 1938)).
50. In January 1930, owners of certain interests in a play assigned the interests to Hans
Bartsch who assigned these interests to Warner Brothers Pictures, Inc. ("Warner Brothers") in May
of that year. See Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 151-52. Warner Brothers, in turn, transferred the rights it had
acquired to Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. in early 1935. See id. at 152.
51. See id. at 155.
52. 538 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
53. See i at 212.
54. See id. at 227.
55. Id. at 228 (quoting the contract entered into by the parties).
56. Id.
57. Id
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approach. In ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Westminster Music, Ltd.,58 the court
decided the scope of publishing rights granted in 1966 in certain songs
recorded by the musical group the Rolling Stones5 9 Though the contract
granted Westminster "all rights" in the songs, a dispute arose because
the rights to technologies yet to be developed was not addressed in the
contract, nor was it discussed in the negotiations.6 Noting that the law
addressing the issue of licensing rights in new technologies was unsettled, the court relied upon Professor Nimmer's two approach analysis,
and settled upon the preferred, broad construction approach.61
The Second Circuit once again affirmed its use of Nimmer's preferred approach in Bourne v. Walt Disney Co.62 The Bourne court decided a dispute over videocassette rights involving an assignment of
rights dated many years before the advent of this technology.63 Bourne
claimed that Disney violated the copyright through the sale of videocassette recordings featuring Bourne's copyrighted songs.6 The agreement
covering the songs' copyright assignments to Bourne contained provisions reserving rights to Disney which allowed the recording of songs
"'in synchronism with any and all of the motion pictures which may be
made by [Disney] and the right ... to give public performances of such
recordings in connection with the exhibition of the motion pictures with
which said recordings were synchronized."'6 " The court construed the
meaning of "motion picture" in a broad sense, extending the right of
videocassette recording to Disney. 6
The use of the broad construction approach by courts focused on
the sophistication of the parties, the ambiguity of the copyright assignment language, and the ability of the parties to contemplate such use at
the time the agreement was executed, rather than its existence. The
58. 838 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
59. See id. at 154.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 155.
62. 68 F.3d 621 (2d Cir. 1995).
63. See id. at 623.
64. See id.
65. Id.at 625 (alteration in original).
66. The court disagreed with Boume's contention that the definition of "motion picture" had
"a sufficiently definite and precise meaning as to allow for interpretation as a matter of law." Id. at
630. Rather, the court subscribed to a definition broader than the "celluloid-film medium"; the
term "motion picture" can be defined as:
"a broad genus whose fundamental characteristic is a series of related images that impart an impression of motion when shown in succession, including any sounds integrally conjoined with the images. Under this concept the physical form in which the
motion picture is fixed-film, tape, discs and so forth-is irrelevant."
Id. (quoting S.REP. No.92-72, at 5 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1571).
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Bartsch court regarded the strength of a broad construction approach to
be its encouragement of the use of new media by expanding the originally licensed medium. 67 The weakness of this approach, however, couples not only the copyright licensor's unexpected loss of exclusive

copyright, but also the court's broad discretion in defining a new-use
from within the definition of already existing media originally licensed
in the agreement. This inevitably leads to contrary
conclusions regard6
ing the same type of comparison between media.
B. The StrictApproach
A number of jurisdictions adhere to Ninimer's strict approach,
holding that unless expressly granting the right to any and all methods
invented in the future,69 the right to exploit a use invented after the execution of an agreement is reserved to the original copyright holder."
This approach extends to a licensee only those uses that are unambiguously referred to in the "core meaning of the term[s] of the agreement."' Therefore, the courts interpret whether the new-use clearly falls
within the "core meaning."7 This approach encourages the use of clear
unambiguous terms in the drafting of license agreements, and discourages sophisticated parties from taking advantage of unsophisticated
parties in the drafting process. 3 The strict approach is also "the only
method under which copyright holders are assured the enjoyment of
future demands for their work."7 4 Under the preferred approach, the
author only receives payment for the original value of the work at the
67. "[The preferred approach] provides a single person who can make the copyrighted work
available to the public over the penumbral medium, whereas the narrower one involves the risk
that a deadlock between the grantor and the grantee might prevent the [work from] being shown
over the new medium at all." Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150, 155 (2d Cir.
1968).
68. An example of this problem is discussed by Sidney A. Rosenzweig's comparison of the
courts' connection and the contrary lack of connection between television and videocassettes in
Rooney v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) and Cohen v.
Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988), respectively. See Rosenzweig, supra
note 15, at 917-18 n.88.
69. Other language used to express a broad assignment of rights in electronic rights contracts
has included "'in any other media now existing or hereafter developed ...in perpetuity throughout the universe."' Calvin Reid, 'Harper's' to Pay Authors Royalties on Digitized Content,
PUBLISHERS WKLY.,Feb. 12, 1996, at 12 (quoting terms of sample agreements).
70. See Nakos, supra note 44, at 446.
71. NuIMER & NIMMER, supra note 40, at 10-90.
72. See id. The strict approach excludes new-uses from the licensee if the answer to whether
that new-use is included under those uses explicitly set out in the agreement is ambiguous. See id.
73. See Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379, 1388 (1st Cir. 1993).
74. Nakos, supra note 44, at 448.
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time of the original assignment of rights, despite the fact that new-uses
usually grant the licensee substantial additional revenue above and beyond the price paid by the licensee without further compensation to the
author.75 This substantial monetary windfall to licensees and the loss of
income by authors under the preferred approach has helped to promote
the adoption of the strict approach.76
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals employed the strict approach
in Cohen v. ParamountPictures Corp.77 In contrast to cases decided
pursuant to the broad approach, the court held that a license conferring
the right to exhibit film "by means of television" did not include the
right to distribute videocassettes of the film for home viewing.78 The
court limited the meaning of "any, manner, medium, or form," because
the agreement did not contain express language authorizing distribution
by sale or rental.79 The court's primary reason for not extending the
meaning of "exhibition by means of television" to the distribution of
videocassettes was because VCRs for home use were unknown when
the agreement was executed in 1969." Furthermore, without the awareness of this medium by the parties, the licensee could not have bargained for, or paid for, these rights.8' The court also rejected Paramount's exhibition by television claim, by creating a distinction
between television and videocassettes 2
In Tele-Pac, Inc. v. Grainger," another videocassette rights dispute, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court held that
the right to distribute motion pictures "'for broadcasting by television or
any other similar device now known or hereafter to be made known"'
did not include the videocassette and videodisc rights.m Because the
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988).
78. See id. at 852 (quoting the terms of the license).
79. See id. at 853.
80. See id. at 854.
81. See id.
82. The court painstakingly distinguished "'exhibition by television"' from exhibition by
means of a videocassette recorder, and deemed the two media "fundamentally" different. See id. at
853-54. The court opined that "[tielevision requires an intermediary network, station, or cable to
send the television signals into consumers' homes." Id. Thus, it was the intermediary that controlled the programming content, and not the consumer. Videocassettes clearly offered a different
option by allowing the consumer control to view any portion of a movie at any time. See id. at
854. The one similarity the court noted was that videocassettes may be exhibited by using a television monitor, but the court made clear that "it does not follow that, for copyright purposes,
playing videocassettes constitutes 'exhibition by television."' Id. at 853.
83. 570 N.Y.S.2d 521 (App. Div. 1991).
84. Id. at 522 (quoting the terms of the agreement).
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grant was limited by its own terms, an important question was whether
the parties actually contemplated a future use."' Proceeding from the
finding that the language limited itself, the court distinguished Tele-Pac
from Rooney, because Rooney "turned on the sweeping language of the
grants involved." 6 The court ultimately adopted the distinction made by
the Cohen court between television and VCRs, thereby rendering the
use of Professor Nimmer's strict approach unnecessary.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals also adopted Nimmer's strict
approach in the 1993 case Rey v. Lafferty." The court was called upon to
decide a dispute regarding the scope of a license for film episodes of
Curious George." The original license granted a production company
the right to make films for television viewing 0 The production company went on to market the films for videocassette sales.9 The court
adopted the Cohen court's analysis, distinguishing television and videocassette viewing which, at most, had a viewing screen in common.' The
court ruled that because videocassette technology could not have been
contemplated by the parties, it was impossible for these rights to have
been part of the agreement.3 This holding thereby ratified the strict approach by excluding any rights not explicitly included in the medium
described by the grant of rights. 94 These new-use rights would be reserved to the grantor. 5
I.

BEYOND VIDEOCASSETrES: TASINIAND THE NEw-USE OF
ONLINE PUBLISHING

Technological advancement has historically acted as a catalyst for
changes in copyright law.96 It is rare that changes in the law anticipate

85. See id. at 524-25.
86. Id. at 525.

87. "Indeed, television and VCR technology 'have very little in common besides the fact
that a conventional monitor of a television set may be used both to receive television signals and
to exhibit a videocassette' or videodisc." Id. at 525 (quoting with approval Cohen v. Paramount
Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1988)).
88. 990 F.2d 1379 (1st Cir. 1993).
89. See iU at 1381.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 1383.

92. See id. at 1389-90.
93. See id. at 1390.
94. See id. at 1391.
95.

See id.

96. See generally Ebbinghouse, supra note 9, at 56 (discussing copyrights secured by a
multi-media producer and the pre-existing works licensed to a multi-media producer); see also
Galley, supra note 33, at 3 ("The advent of new communication technologies has consistently
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problems created by technological advancements.7 The most recent
technology which has led to clamors for change in copyright law is
electronic publishing." High-speed and low-priced computers have led
to the dawning of the information age. With a computer terminal, a modem, and the World Wide Web and Internet, vast amounts of knowledge
and access to all types of publications are instantly available." CDROMs and online services are making the gathering of articles, periodicals, and all types of reference materials easier for consumers. Additionally, there is great potential for profit, but for whom? Should the
authors who originate the material gain the profit, or should the publishers of the print media who choose to republish their publications electronically, or the service providers who harness and collate the information making it easier for users to find what they are looking for, profit
from the new technology? These questions, along with contract issues
affecting this controversy, were raised by a recent case in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, Tasini v. New York
Times Co.1t The answers required a legal analysis of copyright law,
specifically particular sections of the Copyright Law of 1976, as well as
contract principles. While trying to clear up these issues, the decision
has left many questions about electronic publishing in doubt.' '
Tasini v. New York Times Co. was filed in December 1993 by six
freelance writers against two newspaper publishers, two magazine publishers, and two electronic reusers of published works.'02 It remained in
posed problems in the area of copyright law."); Wendy R. Leibowitz, Revising Copyrights and
Wrongs: New Media as Copying Machines, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 1, 1997, at B9 (stating that copyright
law has always trailed new technology); Saez, supra note 6, at 372-73 (finding that the "case law
...has lagged behind in producing a coherent approach to old contracts vis-h-vis new technologies").
97. According to Bob Simons of Knight-Ridder's Dialog: "'The technology is in front of the
law and practical business considerations."' Ebbinghouse, supra note 9, at 56 (referring to the current standoff between writers and publishers regarding online publishing). Unfortunately, the law
has not often been in the vanguard in recognizing the significance of a new technology on copyright. See Saez, supra note 6, at 372-73.
98. Similar to a passage of Judge Sotomayor's opinion in the Tasini case, Marybeth Peters,
Register of Copyrights and Associate Librarian for Copyright Services, noted that perhaps technology has outpaced the foresight of the drafters of the Copyright Act of 1976. See Heidi Tolliver,
Laws Muddle On-Line Copyright, PRunNG NEWs EAST, May 27, 1996, at 1.
99. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
100. 972 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), reconsideration denied, 981 F. Supp. 841 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
101. See Dale M. Cendali & Ramon E. Reyes, Jr., Freelancers Reeling in Fight over Online
Rights, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 20, 1997, at C2; Calvin Reid, Freelancers Lose Copyright Suit on Electronic Rights, PUBtISHERs WKLY., Aug. 18, 1997, at 14.
102. The plaintiffs in the case were six freelance writers who sold articles to various newspapers and magazines for publication, including those of the defendants. See Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at
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the district court for three and a half years until August 13, 1997, when
Judge Sonia Sotomayor handed down her ruling: summary judgment for
defendants.' 3 Though most have viewed the ruling as a major defeat for
the plaintiffs, a number of issues were addressed in the ruling, and not
°
all of them were adverse to the position of the writers.'O
Before discussing the issues of Tasini, it is important to understand
the significance of freelance writers to the suit, and the instrumentalities
involved for purposes of this discussion.
A.

Freelance Writers

Six freelance writers brought the Tasini suit."5 The importance of
this fact derives from the significance of freelancing in reference to
copyright infringement. The defendants' publications included two
categories of works: articles authored by freelancers and articles
authored by employees of the publications (articles deemed "works
made for hire").'O The potential for copyright infringement by the publisher is inapplicable to the articles written under the latter category." 7 A
work made for hire can be created in two ways under section 101 of the
Copyright Act. First, an article falls under the status of work for hire if
it is created by employees within the scope of their employment.' An
article also falls under the work for hire status if it is specially ordered
for use in a collective work, and there is a written agreement signed by
both parties that the article shall be considered a work for hire.'O As a
work for hire, the publication, or for whomever the work is made, is
considered the author and thereby owns all the rights of the copyright."

806. The defendant-publishers in the case were the New York Times Co., Newsday Inc., Time Inc.
(publishers of Sports Illustrated),and the Atlantic Monthly Co. See id. Also named as defendants
in the case were the companies responsible for bringing the articles online, Mead Data Central
Corp. (owners and operators of NEXIS) and University Microfilms Inc. (producers of CD-ROM
products, including the New York Times On-Disc). See id. The Atlantic Monthly agreed to settle
the lawsuit. See id. at 806 n.1. However, the Atlantic Monthly did not admit any wrongdoing in
settling their lawsuit See Ross Kerber, Atlantic Monthly Agrees to Settle over Electronic Publishing, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 1996, at B6.
103. See Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 827.
104. See Cendali & Reyes, supranote 101, at C2; Frances A. McMorris, Judge Rules Against
Free-Lancersin Lawsuit over ElectronicRights, vALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 1997, at B9; Noack, supra
note 13, at 7-8; Reid, supra note 13, at 10.
105. See supranote 102 and accompanying text.
106. See Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 806-07.
107. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994).

108. See id. § 101.
109. See id.
110. See id. § 201(b).
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Conversely, the articles at issue in the Tasini case were freelance
assignments, whereby the copyright in the article stays with the author
and not the publication, unless it was expressly transferred via a signed
written agreement."' Articles written by freelance writers for newspapers and magazines have traditionally been assigned and completed by
the authors without formal contracts, and almost never with a discussion
of electronic rights compensation."' When freelancers and publishers
have contracted for these assignments, they have traditionally used language allowing publishers "first North American serial rights."". To
most authors, this has always meant what it expressly states, that
"'[f]irst means first-run and North American means limited to the continent of North America."'1 4 The Tasini plaintiffs claimed that many
publishers, even under these types of agreements, have subsequently
made authors' works available via electronic media (after the original
print publication) without payment to these authors.115
B. Collective Works
All parties stipulated that the defendants' publications qualified as
"collective works" under the definition provided by the Copyright Act
' The Copyright Act emphasizes the difference between the
of 1976.16
copyright held by the author in the original contribution, and the separate and distinct copyright held by the publisher in the particular collective work comprised of several contributions." 7 This emphasis was set
out in order to prevent publishers from exploiting the individual works
of authors, and to provide publishers with sufficient leeway in which to

111. See Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 806.
112. See Rita Ciolli, Writers Lose Decision on Electronic Publishing, NEWSDAY (Long Island, N.Y.), Aug. 14, 1997, at A57.
113. Kincade, supranote 9, at 30.
114. Id.
115. The use of freelancers by publishers is relevant to the underlying focus on the financial

bottom line. Most freelancers do not receive health insurance or pensions as do full-time employee
writers. See Tasini vs. The New York Times: What's at Stake for the Public? (last modified Aug.

14, 1997) <vvw.igc.orglnwu/tvt/tvtpubl.htm>. The lack of these and other employee benefits for
freelancers cuts costs for these publishers. See id.; Nan Levinson & Donna Demac, New Media
Bring New Problems to CopyrightArena, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1996, at Dl.

116. See Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 809. "A 'collective work' is a work, such as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and
independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
117. Section 201(c) of the Copyright Act expressly states: "Copyright in each separate contribution to a collective work is distinct from copyright in the collective work as a whole, and vests
initially in the author of the contribution." 17 U.S.C. § 201(c).
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reproduce and revise their collective works."' These goals are achieved
by the "privileges" given to publishers under section 201(c) of the
Copyright Act." 9 These privileges allow the holder of the copyright in
the collective work only to "reproduc[e] and distribut[e] the contribution as part of that particular collective work, any revision of that collective work, and any later collective work in the same series.' 2 0
C. Issues
1. Contracts
Tasini sets a baseline for future agreements acquiring electronic
rights by requiring these agreements to be "clear, timely and broad
enough to cover the electronic rights purportedly transferred.'' Two of
the three publisher defendants claimed that the plaintiffs had "expressly
transferred" the electronic rights in their articles." Judge Sotomayor
first established that according to section 204(a) of the Copyright Act,
the only way a copyright in a work could be transferred was explicitly
in a writing.'2 This transfer contract had to be clear and unambiguous24
Each of the two defendants who were affected by this provision
had different forms of contracts by which they claimed that the authors
had "expressly transferred" their rights. Newsday claimed that the transfer of electronic rights was established by the inclusion of a legend upon
the payment check received and cashed by the plaintiffs.'1 Time
(publisher of Sports Illustrated), on the other hand, did have a written
contract, which it claimed was evidence that it had acquired the right to
electronically publish plaintiffs' article. 26 Time based this argument on
the fact that the passage of the contract giving Sports Illustrated "the
exclusive right first to publish" was media neutral and therefore posed
no media limitation."

118. See Tasini, 972F. Supp. at 819.
119. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(c).
120. Id.
121. Cendali & Reyes, supra note 101, at C2.
122. Newsday and Time were the two defendants claiming an express transfer of electronic
rights. See Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 810.
123. See id.
124. The court stressed the need to avoid ambiguity by noting that even a one-line statement
transferring copyright interests must be clear. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 807, 811.
127. In making this argument, Time cited Bartsch,Bourne, and Rooney, all of which adopted
Nimmer's preferred approach discussed earlier in Part II. See id. at 811-12.
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Both Newsday's and Time's arguments were rejected by Judge
Sotomayor. Regarding Newsday's check legends, the court found that
there was no evidence to conclude that both parties intended for the articles to be published electronically.2' Therefore, the check legends
could not serve as a validation of a prior oral agreement, as Newsday
had claimed.' 29 In addition, Judge Sotomayor found the check legends to
be ambiguous and therefore "[could not] be taken to reflect an express
transfer of electronic rights in plaintiffs' articles."' 3 Time's argument
that its contract terms were media-neutral, and should therefore be extended to electronic media, was also misplaced. Judge Sotomayor held
that the defendant's line of reasoning was based upon cases which did
not involve contracts with a "temporal" aspect, as did the contract in
this case.' The contract terms called for Time to acquire only "first
publication rights."'32 The court reasoned that "[tihe right to publish an
article 'first' cannot reasonably be stretched into a right to be the first to
publish an article in any and all mediums."'33 When the article was published electronically, it had already been published in the print issue of
Sports Illustratedmagazine. 1"4 Clearly, the electronic publication, which
came after the original print publication, could not have been the "first"
publication.'35
2. Revisions of Collective Works
Judge Sotomayor's finding that none of the authors had expressly
transferred to the publishers the electronic rights in their articles required the court to find that the publishers had produced only revisions
of their collective works under section 201(c) of the Copyright Act in
order to avoid copyright infringement by the publisher-defendants.' 36
Judge Sotomayor found that the publishers possessed the right to revise

128. Seeid. at810-11.
129. The authors received the checks after Newsday had already transferred the plaintiffs
articles to NEXIS. See id. at 810. Thus, any supposed transfer of rights effectuated by the cashing
of the checks with the legends occurred too late. See id, Newsday parried, arguing that the check
legends merely acted as a validation of a prior oral agreement between the authors and Newsday.
See id. Newsday put forth no evidence of the oral contract, and the authors summarily denied that
one existed. See id. at 810-11.
130. lat8ll.
131. Time based its argument on the Bartsch line of cases, stressing Nimmer's broad approach
to interpreting ambiguous contract terms regarding new uses. See id. at 812.
132. I.
133. Id.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id.
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their collective works under section 201(c) of the Copyright Act, but
cautioned that these rights are subject to some limitations.' The new
work must be recognizable as a version of a preexisting collective work
in order to be considered a version of that collective work.' These preliminary findings by the court exposed the central issue to be addressed
by the Tasini case: how to determine whether something is an acceptable revision or a new work.9 To address this issue, the court suggested
a two-step approach.' 4 First, distinguishing original characteristics of
the works must be identified.' 4' Second, it must be determined whether
these characteristics are preserved in the supposed revision. 142 Only if
the new work possesses the distinguishing original characteristics
may it
43
work.
collective
previous
the
of
revision
a
termed
be
Judge Sotomayor determined that in the Tasini case, the defining
original aspect of the defendants' publications was the selection of articles included in those publications.'" The plaintiffs, however, argued
that the use of their articles in searchable databases immerses their articles side-by-side with thousands of other articles not originally part of
the same collective work.45 Furthermore, distinguishing original characteristics, such as arrangement, lay-out, and photography were removed
in the electronic display of the collective works. 46 The court responded
that the publishers' works could still be deemed revisions of their collective works despite plaintiffs' argument because the copyrightable
selection of the publishers was maintained by headers on articles pulled
up on the NEXIS system. 47 These headers refer the researcher to the
page of the original print version of the collective work in which the accessed article appeared.'" The electronic preservation of the original
selection of articles qualified the electronic database as a revision and

137. See id. at 820-21.
138. See id. at 820.
139. See iULat 820-21.
140. See id.
141. See id. The court based this step on the Supreme Court's ruling in Feist Publications,
Inc. v. Rural TeL Serv. Co, 499 U.S. 340 (1991). See id.
142. See iii at 821.

143. See id
144. See id. at 825 (noting, however, that this did not create a rule that a revision of a collective work is created whenever "an original selection or arrangement is preserved in a subsequent
creation").
145. See id at 821, 823-24.
146. See id at 824-25.
147. See id at 821.
148. See id at 821-23.
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not a new work.' 49
3. Right of Electronic Revision
Having rejected plaintiffs' general revision argument, the court
then rejected plaintiffs' argument that the revisions permitted under
section 201(c) only allowed revisions of the collective work in the same
5 The court found that
medium in which the work originally appeared."
while the publishers only had rights in their collective works and not in
the individual articles comprising them, section 201(c) of the Copyright
Act did allow them to electronically publish revisions."' In reaching this
conclusion, the court addressed three subissues. First, the court rejected
the plaintiffs' theory that section 201(c) precluded revisions via the use
of computers.'5 2 The court stated that though section 201(c) does not
explicitly grant publishers the right to "display" a work publicly,'53 the
right to reproduce a work under section 201(c) necessarily encompasses
the right to create copies of the work, which "presupposes that such
copies might be 'perceived' from a computer terminal."'' Second, the
court rejected plaintiffs' theory that examples of permissible revisions
mentioned in the legislative history suggested a congressional intent to
limit revisions to the same media.' The court rejected this theory as inconsistent with the media neutrality evident in the drafting of the Copyright Act.'56 Finally, the court rejected the writers' argument that the
plain meaning of the word "revision" indicates that the revision must be
in the same medium as the original work.5 7 The court cited both the
language of the statute and its legislative history in determining that
publishers are granted "significant leeway.., to create 'any revision' of
their collective works.' ' 8
4. Protection of Authors' Rights
The court rejected plaintiffs' claims that a decision in favor of the
defendants would provide an economic windfall to publishers and ef-

149. See id. at 823.
150. See id. at 816.
151. See id
152. See id. at 816-17.
153. The display right is essential since the contested revisions were "displayed" on a computer screen. See id. at 816.
154. Id.
155. See id at 817-18.
156. See id. at 818-19.
157. See id at 819-20.

158. I at819.
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fectively eviscerate section 201(c) of the Copyright Act, which prevents
many activities of publishers that could exploit the individual works of
authors.' 59 Though the court recognized that the holding deprived writers
of certain economic benefits and that Congress clearly did not intend the
publishers' windfall, this is true only because Congress drafted the language of the statute without anticipation of the lucrativeness of electronic publication and not because of an overbroad interpretation of the
' Judge Sotomayor suggested that
rights of publishers under 201(c). W
Congress may seek to revise 201(c), but the courts are not required to
take these unanticipated circumstances into account, or to speculate as
to what Congress might have done were it to consider such circumstances. 161
IV.

APPLYING THE STRICT APPROACH TO ONLINE PUBLICATION

As Tasini v. New York Times Co. stands, freelance authors find
themselves in the disadvantageous position of trying to negotiate
monetary compensation for the electronic rights in their works, while
publishers may legally take these rights for use in "revisions" of their
publications without compensation.' 62 The windfall given to publishers
by Tasini's broad interpretation of the term revision under section
201(c) of the Copyright Act is detrimental to the purpose of copyright in
the long-term, and may not even have a short-term positive effect on the
dissemination of information.'63 The central concern of this Note is
whether or not the Tasini decision failed to advance copyright law by
denying freelance authors a piece of the growing64financial pie made
available by the explosion of electronic publishing.'
The Tasini court waffles in its analysis between the strict approach,
or a strict notion, of the transfer of electronic rights in the written and
oral contracts between authors and publishers, and the administration of
a less rigorous scrutiny as to what constitutes a revision under the
159. See id at 826-27.

160. See id
161. Seeidat827.
162. See Federal Court Rules in Favor of Publishers on Electronic Rights, MEDIA DAILY,
Aug. 14, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7731302.
163. Based on the presumption that the purpose of copyright is to promote the public welfare
through the advancement of knowledge, and remaining cognizant of the necessary balance between the parties to copyright, the Tasini ruling acts as a strong disincentive to authors to create
and publish quality work since the financial opportunity of electronic publishing has been destroyed. See supraPart I.
164. See Judge Finds Law on the Side of the Publishers in Free-Lance Dispute, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 15, 1997, at 4 [hereinafter Free-LanceDispute].
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court's interpretation of section 201(c) of the Copyright Act. Without
explicitly mentioning Nimmer's broad or strict approach, Judge Sotomayor's analysis of the contract issue involved in the alleged transfer
of electronic rights to the publishers through the use of Newsday's
check legends and Sports Illustrated's (Time's) contract clearly points
to a preference for the use of the strict approach."' Judge Sotomayor
reasoned that clear and explicit language is necessary for the transfer of
electronic rights in order to avoid the unintended surrender of rights,
and the court rejected a broad interpretation of contract language transferring first print rights.' 6 Having rejected the notion that ambiguous
contracts and check legends transferring first print rights were sufficient
to transfer electronic rights, the court then undermines its holding and
approach by broadly applying the court's interpretation of a publisher's
right to "revision" of their works.'67
The right of revision was the central issue of the case, the issue
upon which the case turned. While the court set forth a well-reasoned
argument for the publishers' right to make revisions in an electronic
medium, the court's method of determining whether a revision existed
was misapplied in the controversy over the NEXIS database.
The court established that the publishers' right to reproduce the
authors' works was limited by section 201(c) "'as part of' a revised
version of 'that collective work' in which the article originally appeared.""' Though the court found that "any revision" may include a
heavily revised work, the court properly noted that this revision must be
recognizable as a version of that preexisting collective work.'69 If the
alleged revision is no longer recognizable as coming from the original
collective work, then a new work has been created, and the publishers
may not reuse the authors' works.70 The court drove home this point by
quoting a House Report which stated that publishers could not place articles into "'new anthologies' or 'entirely different magazine[s] or other
collective work[s],' but only into revisions of those collective works in
which plaintiffs' articles first appeared. 17
The steps of this analysis left the court in a difficult position, requiring a tortured analysis of the collective works' distinguishing char165. See supraPart Mf.C.1.
166. See Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 810-12; supraPart IIT.C.1.
167. See Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 819-27.
168. Id. at 820 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1994)).
169. See id.
170. See id. at 821.
171. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 122-23 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659,5738).
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acteristics and whether or not these characteristics were preserved in the
subsequent work in order to reach the conclusion that the NEXIS electronic database constituted a revision (recognizable as a revision of the
original collective work in that particular distinguishing characteristics
were preserved in that revision). Using its two-step analysis, the court
determined that the fulfillment of its first step (identifying distinguishing original characteristics) may be satisfied by the particular selection
or arrangement of the publications.1 2 Having chosen those two characteristics as the only distinguishing characteristics, it became necessary
to determine that they both remained evident in the alleged revision.' It
is evident that the NEXIS database, which does not reproduce photo images of the actual pages of the publications, (thereby not reproducing
page layout, photos and their captions, and the typefont) did not retain
the original arrangement of the print publication. 7 4 At this point in the
analysis, we have eliminated nearly every trace of an original print copy
of the publication by removing the advertisements, the page layouts, the
photos and their captions, and the typeface. However, the court continued on to find that the NEXIS database still remained recognizable as a
revision of an original edition of the print publication. 5
In order to reconcile the result of the court's analysis with the twostep test set forth earlier, the court was forced to refine the elements of
its test to suggest that even if all characteristics of the collective work
are destroyed, except for the selection of articles, the original work remained intact (again, despite the fact that this selection is immersed
within the entire database consisting of other collective works). "6 The
court gave cursory attention to the plaintiffs' argument that topic-based
searches (not by each collective work) accomplished by "Boolean
searches" on NEXIS have results which do not maintain the selection of
an entire collective work. The court responded that despite the fact that
the publishers' original selection of articles of a particular issue were
immersed within hundreds of thousands of other articles from different
publications, the original selection remained intact.' The court asserted
that because the possibility of searching NEXIS for the articles of a
particular issue existed, and because once retrieved by any search means
172. See id. at 820.
173. See id.
174. This point does not address the image-based CD-ROM versions of the New York Times
Book Review and Sunday Magazine, because all aspects of selection and arrangement therein remain intact due to photo-imaging. See id. at 824.
175. See id. at 821-25.
176. See id,
177. See id at 823-25.
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(by issue, publication, or date), the individual articles come up with
headings including the publication title and the page number on which
the article first existed, the original selection was preserved.178
Common sense and NEXIS experience suggests that the court's argument is flawed and tenuous. When an individual article is called up
on the computer screen via a NEXIS search, the typical NEXIS user
cannot possibly grasp the publishers' original selection of articles in a
particular issue because the user reads a header stating that a particular
article was from the New York Times and was once on page A6. The
adjoining page of the print edition is not visible, nor are the other articles which are located on the same page as the subject article in the
print edition. The court also spoke of the prestige and enhancement of
value an article gains by its affiliation with a particular publication,
wholly neglecting the notion that a publication's value may be enhanced
by printing articles written by well-known and respected authors. 79 The
most intriguing argument put forth by the court was that technologies
such as NEXIS "serve the same basic function as newspapers and
magazines" and are used for the "same purposes that [readers] might
otherwise review the hard copy versions of those periodicals."'"8 This
assertion by the court would seem ludicrous to the many New York
commuters who rustle and fold the New York Times or some other
newspaper or magazine to inform themselves of the days events and to
pass the time during their morning commute. It is an enormous leap, at
best, to say that NEXIS users utilize the electronic database on a daily
or weekly basis in order to keep abreast of the day's news.
The publishers put forth a similar argument equating the electronic
database to microfilm. 8' Substantial differences exist between the two.
First, the original selection and arrangement are kept intact including
the page layout, photos, and advertisements on microfilm. Second, and
most important to the financial side of the dispute, by the time publications make it to microfilm, authors have already benefited financially
from their articles, whereas the transfer from print to electronic database
can be done so quickly via today's technology that authors have no opportunity to benefit financially from their work.8 2 Another point ad178. See id.
at 825.
179. See Safran,supra note 30, at 51.
180. Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 825.
181. See Garigliano, supra note 9, at 12; Daniel R. Marcus, Applying Old Law to New Media,
AM. LAW., Oct. 1997, at 31; Michael Rapoport, Ct-On-LineRights 2: Must Apply Law As Written,
DoW JONES NEWS SERV., Aug. 13, 1997, available in Westlaw, Ailnews Library, Nynews File.
182. See Matthew McAllester, Contract Threatens Free-Lancers' Right to Resell Articles,
NEWSDAY (Long Island, N.Y.), Mar. 30, 1997, at A43.
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vanced by plaintiffs, which suggests that even the publishers themselves
realized the inherent difference between reproducing only the articles
and reproducing the entire page layout as is possible through CD-ROMs
and microfilm, is evidenced by the language used in the license agreements between the publishers, Mead (NEXIS), and UMI Company,
formerly known as United Microfilms Inc. The agreement with Mead
explicitly prohibited
NEXIS from making facsimile reproductions of the
183
Times.
York
New
Clearly, Judge Sotomayor realized the potential harm that her
analysis could have caused authors, and she consequently limited and
defined the steps necessary to determine that a revision had been created. Unfortunately, Judge Sotomayor neglected to give much weight to
the common usage of electronic databases, as well as the common sense
notion that a print version of the New York Times is not recognizable not
only when stripped of the page layout, typefont, photos, and advertisements, but also when transferred from print to a computer screen. The
Tasini court was forced, through a tortured analysis, to fit the facts of
the case into the criteria it set out for itself. Strictly applying the court's
criteria to the facts would have shown that the distinguishing characteristics of the original publications, the selection of articles and the arrangement, are no longer recognizable by a researcher using NEXIS.
Therefore, the court should have ruled that the veritable fleecing of
freelance authors by the publishers was not legal under section 201(c) of
the Copyright Act.
Tasini v. New York Times Co. is not the first new-use case, and undoubtedly will not be the last. It is paramount in these cases to further
the purpose of copyright-to promote knowledge and learning in the
public interest." The court's approach, while well-reasoned structurally, fails to further the basic goals and purpose of copyright because of
its strained application.
A strict approach is better suited for interpreting contracts allegedly transferring electronic rights and for interpreting the revision rights
of publishers under the Copyright Act. The strict approach advances the
theory that rights to publish copyrighted material in a new-use (which in
Tasini was from print publication to electronic publication) remain with
the author unless explicitly granted to the publisher by means of an express statement.'85 Under the facts of Tasini, such an approach clearly
183. See Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 826 n.17.
184. See supra PartI.
185. The granting of rights in future media need not address a particular medium. The transfer
of rights may be accomplished by means of inclusive contract provisions which grant rights to any
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furthers the goal of providing economic incentives to authors by allowing them to freely contract for the right to publish in future media which
they never anticipated giving to the publisher. The strict approach is the
only approach in which authors would be allowed to benefit from the
future demand for their work. Judge Sotomayor's overbroad interpretation of the Copyright Act is more in line with Nimmer's broad approach
to new-use rights, depriving authors of the right to receive compensation for future revenue derived from the publication of their work in
new media. In reassessing Tasini and future electronic rights cases or
future new-use controversies concerning media not yet invented, employing the spirit of Nimmer's strict approach will yield results advantageous to the interests of all parties as a whole and the goals of copyright.
V.

THE EFFECTS OF TASINI AND REMEDIES TO PREVENT

UNNECESSARY NEW-USE CONTROVERSIES
Tasini v. New York Times Co. is undoubtedly only the opening
salvo in what will be a prolonged battle over electronic publishing
rights. Immediately after the decision, plaintiffs submitted a motion for
reconsideration,S' explored the prospects of lobbying Congress to
change the Copyright Act, ' and now plan to appeal Judge Sotomayor's
decision."' Other circuits will also weigh in with their interpretations of
the same or similar issues raised in Tasini, as they have done in past
new-use controversies. 9 If the other circuits remain true to their rulings,
u However,
not all of them will agree with Judge Sotomayor's decision.'Y
for the time being, authors, publishers, and users are stuck with the decision and its implications for each of them.
A. Effects of Tasini
The Tasini ruling will have numerous effects on the online publishing industry. The first, which has already been felt throughout the pubmedia invented in the future. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
186. Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration was denied on October 29, 1997. See Tasini v.
New York Times Co., 981 F. Supp. 841, 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); N.Y. Judge Won't Reconsider Ruling Allowing Inclusion of Articles on Electronic Databases, CD-ROMs, MEALEY'S LrT. REP.:
INTELL. PRop., Nov. 17, 1997, at 3.
187. See Reid, supra note 13, at 11, 14.
188. See National Writers Union, Appeal of Landmark Lawsuit over Electronic Rights, M2
PRESVIRE, Feb. 25, 1998, available in 1998 WL 10217910.
189. See supraPart I.
190. See supra Part l.B; supranotes 69-95 and accompanying text.
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lishing community, is one of surprise and caution on the part of authors
and publishers alike. Since the inception of this suit in 1993, publishers,
doubting that they would prevail, began to formalize their agreements
with freelance authors, and made sure that these contracts addressed the
issue of electronic rights.'9' While attorneys for the publishers claim that
the decision only maintains the status quo, the "electronic rights grab"' '
policy pursued by the legal departments of publishers in the time leading up to and after the Tasini ruling suggests little confidence in their
position and the ruling. Publishers hoping to avoid further lawsuits and
authors hoping to see some revenue from the electronic exploitation of
their work have begun to demand written contracts addressing electronic rights. 93 Prior to the Tasini decision, publications like the Boston
Globe and the New York Times demanded all electronic rights from their
freelance writers without additional compensation.' These publications
have used a "take it or leave it" approach toward negotiating these contracts. 95 The Tasini decision gives more leverage to the already powerful publishers when they offer little or no compensation to authors for
their electronic rights. Where does this leave readers? With most of the
bigger publications demanding electronic rights, some authors are reluctantly signing these contracts in order to make a living.'96 Still others are
simply choosing to walk away."9 By extension, readers will have to endure less talented writers and a lower quality of work product.
Although the Tasini decision dealt primarily with electronic databases and CD-ROM compilations, an issue which arises from the aftermath of Tasini is whether the decision is limited to only to electronic
databases and CD-ROM compilations, or whether the decision should
be read broadly to cover the Internet?19 As the nation becomes increasingly connected to the Internet, and a growing number of publications
look to launching online versions of their publications in order to in-

191. See Ron Coleman, Copycats on the Superhighway, A.B.A. J.,
July 1995, at 68,71.
192. Electronic "rights grab" contracts are attempts by publishers to obtain all possible rights
in the electronic medium, and sometimes in all media whether currently existing or invented in the
future, all for the same compensation that they would provide for only print rights. See David J.
Loundy, Authors Waging Fight in Brave New World, Cm. DAILYL. BULL., Mar. 7, 1996, at 6.
193. See Kincade, supra note 9, at 30.
194. See lanzito, supra note 8, at 15, 16; Anya Sacharow, Rights Make Might: Seeking Online
Revenue, DailiesRevise Contractsfor FreelanceWriters, MEDIAWEEK, Jan. 15, 1996, at 12.
195. See Ianzito, supra note 8, at 15; Sacharow, supra note 194, at 12.
196. See Ianzito, supra note 8, at 15, 16.
197. See Levinson &Demac, supra note 115, atD1.
198. See Larry Jaffee, CourtDecision Extends to Web: N.Y. Times Exec, MEDIA DAILY, Aug.
18, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 7731327.
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crease readership and revenues,'" the Tasini fight may be launched once
again on this new front. While many have concluded that the fight centers around the desire by authors to gain revenue for their work, some
authors point out that they are also interested in simply getting their
work out in the public.' Some lesser-known authors want to publish
their own articles online to take advantage of free public access."' By
granting the right to electronically publish these articles, the Tasini decision allows publishers to limit public access to authors' works by demanding payment for specific articles (which an author may wish to
distribute for free), or by limiting exposure of an article by entering into
exclusivity agreements which allow only one electronic service provider
the right to display that article.2'
B. Future Remedies
Increasingly, authors and publishers are contracting for electronic
rights, and sometimes for all future-use rights. Herein lies the ultimate
solution to the controversy, provided both sides are willing to compromise from their positions. Publishers are concerned that in contractual
negotiations for electronic rights, they receive enough profit gained by
the electronic exploitation of authors' articles to meet the great expense
needed to experiment, promote, and utilize new technologies.' °3 If publishers had to pay authors every time an author's article is displayed via
a new technology, not only would this diminish this lucrative source of
revenue for themselves, but it would also increase the expense to promote and utilize new technologies due to the difficulty of tracking down
authors every time a publisher wants to use their articles, and the enormous inconvenience of sending out numerous, small-figure royalty
checks 0 4 Authors' concerns include the fear that publishers are exploiting their work for profit without compensating the authors. 25 The bottom line for users is simply that they want continued cheap access to the
most material possible.

199. See Free-Lance Dispute, supranote 164, at 4.
200. See Ebbinghouse, supranote 9, at 51, 52.
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See Sacharow, supra note 194, at 12, 13.
204. "We realize publishers don't want to get in the business of writing 98 cent checks."
Authors Registry Helps PublishersDistribute Electronic Usage Fees, NEW MEDIA WK., Mar. 31,
1997, available in 1997 WL 7968678 [hereinafter Usage Fees] (quoting National Writers Union's
director of licensing Irvin Muchnick).
205. See Gailey, supranote 33, at 12-13.
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In addition to the explicit contracting for electronic rights, the future solution of this controversy, also involves the use of copyright
clearing centers, which will assist in easing the concerns of the parties.
Writers groups are trying to address publishers' practical concerns regarding the difficulty in maintaining a system by which to track down
authors and make royalty payments by using computer technology
(ironically, the medium which has put authors in their unsavory position) and looking to royalty institutions in other industries to establish
their own royalty distribution organizations.2 6 The literary community
is looking to the music industry and their organizations (Broadcast Music Inc. and the American Society of Composers Authors and Publishers), which perform functions similar to those sought by authors!'0
While numerous parties are seeking to provide this service for authors
and publishers, three main organizations have emerged.
The oldest of the three organizations is the Copyright Clearinghouse Center ("CCC"),"8 which has collected royalties and fees for a
number of years, and which was set up at the recommendation of Congress. 20 The CCC represents approximately 9000 publishers and allows
publishers to set a royalty rate which they want to receive for licenses
provided through the CCC to copyright users making photocopies of the
publications.210 The CCC acts as a non-exclusive licensing agent for
these publishers, and is able to issue licenses limited in scope or time
period.2 "
The second and third organizations are more closely geared towards authors. The first of the two, the Authors Registry, was founded
in 1995 by the American Society of Journalists and Authors, the
Authors Guild, the Dramatist Guild, and the Association of Authors
Representatives.212 The Authors Registry 2"3 keeps a database of regis-

206. See Usage Fees, supranote 204.
207. See John B. Kennedy & Shoshana R. Dweck, Publishers,Authors Battle over Electronic
Rights: Debate over Allocation of Rights and Money Sparks Lawsuits and Birth of the Authors'

Registry, NAT'LLJ., Oct. 28, 1996, at C17.
208. See Loundy, supra note 192, at 6.
209.

See id.

210. See id. The Copyright Clearinghouse Center ("CCC") collects fees from licensees and
charges a nine percent fee before passing these fees on to the publishers. See id.
211. See id. The CCC is using computer technology in partnerships with Xerox and NouSoft
to create systems that allow college bookstores to prepare course materials while using the CCC's
pre-approved rights database to calculate the royalties due. See id.; see also Princeton Univ. Press
v. Michigan Document Servs. Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1383 (6th Cir. 1996) (discussing the Copyright
Act and violations by copy centers that prepare "course packs" without first obtaining permission
from the owner of the copyright).
212. See Usage Fees, supra note 204. The American Society of Journalists and Authors
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tered authors and articles by compiling lists from writers organizations,
literary agents, and individual authors.1 4 The Authors Registry also
takes care of the administrative work (formerly done by the publishers
seeking to use the copyrighted work), which includes the writing and
mailing of royalty checks.215 Publishers participate in the free service by
sending the Authors Registry a lump sum of money to be distributed, as
well as a list setting forth the writers to be compensated and the amount
each is to be paid.216 Each publisher is free to determine the payment
schedule for the fees and royalties.2 7
Lastly, the Publication Rights Clearinghouse ("PRC"), created in
1996 by the National Writers Union ("NWU"), 25 goes a step further
than the passive Authors Registry by using a collective-licensing system."9 The PRC enrolls writerse ° and their works for a fee ranging from
twenty to forty dollars.2a This one-time fee, along with a statement
confirming that the creators retain electronic rights to their work, allows
the PRC to offer its catalog of works to publishers Who are then charged
a fee for each work that is ordered. m The PRC then distributes the

("ASJA") and the Authors Guild have 800 and 6500 members, respectively. See Ebbinghouse,
supranote 9, at 51, 53.
213. In a 1996 article, the Authors Registry was said to include more than 15 writers' groups
and 80 literary agencies. See Kennedy & Dweck, supra note 207, at C17 (citing ASJA Contracts
Watch (July 13, 1995) <http://www.asja.org/ew950713.html>).
214. See Usage Fees, supra note 204.
215. See id.
216. See id. The Registry's adoption of certain administrative tasks has certainly eliminated
some of the costs publishers must incur in paying royalties (Harper's use of the Registry has saved
them between $15,000 and $20,000 per year), but it does not eliminate the responsibility and concurring costs involved in keeping track of their freelancers and how much each author is owed in
royalties. See id.
217. See id.
218. See id. The National Writers Union President, Jonathan Tasini, was the lead plaintiff in
the Tasini v. New York Times Co. case, and was the recipient of one of Publishing Rights Clearinghouse's ("PRC") first cut royalty checks. See The Publication Rights Clearinghousethe National
Writers
Union
Solution
(last
modified
Aug.
14,
1997)
<http://www.igc.org/nwu/tvt/tvtprc.htm> [hereinafter Solution]. The National Writers Union has
approximately 4500 members. See Ebbinghouse, supranote 9, at 53.
219. See Irvin Muchnick, Protecting Writers' Rights Online, MACWORLD, July 1, 1996, at
236, 236. The PRC has garnered support from organizations representing over 70,000 writers, including: The Newspaper Guild, Writers Guild of America (east), Garden Writers Association of
America, PEN Center West, Independent Writers of Southern California, Society of Children's
Book Writers and Illustrators, International Association of Art Critics, and Periodical Writers Association of Canada. See Solution, supranote 218.
220. See Muchnick, supra note 219, at 236. The PRC also enrolls photographers and graphic
artists, as well as other creators. See id.
221. See Ebbinghouse, supranote 9, at 51, 53.
222. See id.
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royalties to authors on a quarterly basis, minus an administrative fee. "
The authors may specify what materials are not to be made available, or
may specify those works which may be distributed free of charge.24
PRC's first licensee was UnCover, a fax reprint service, which is the
world's largest database of magazine and journal articles.2 n However,
some parties have raised concerns over collective-licensing organizations like the PRC. Critics of the PRC claim that it will stifle browsing
and casual copying which are two of the main benefits of Internet access.2s The NWU responds to this concern by citing the fact that many
authors also make use of works on the Internet.27 The NWU claims that
it is not the individual casual user that it is after, but the large, for-profit
information companies like LEXIS-NEXIS."
While these royalty-distributing organizations may provide part of
the solution to using copyright effectively in forwarding the interests of
authors, publishers, and users, they will not accomplish this goal unless
authors retain the electronic rights to their works. The NWU advises its
authors to contract for electronic rights compensation while publishers
are in the midst of the "all-rights grab." 9
Authors must resist the lure of profit, and refrain from gouging
publishers for the use of their articles. Failure to do so will only limit
authors' exposure on the Internet, stifle the incentive to publishers necessary for the expansion of the Internet and other technologies, and ultimately harm their audience-the users.
Technology continues to move forward, not waiting for lawsuits or
for Congress to catch-up. As new-uses to profit from copyright abound,
legal issues will continue to emerge. In framing copyright law to minimize lawsuits, and to further the mandate given to Congress to advance
knowledge in the long-run, courts should adhere to Nimmer's strict approach if we wish to continue to encourage great works and remain a
competitive society. Courts must remain true to the purpose of copyright if we want to prevent the collapse of the intellectual property

223. See Muchnick, supra note 219, at 236. The PRC distributed its first checks from the
royalty pool in May 1996. See Solution, supra note 218.
224. See Ebbinghouse, supra note 9,at 53.
225. See Muchnick, supra note 219, at 236. UnCover is owned by Knight-Ridder, Inc., which
operates a national chain of newspapers and products of the new information industry. See Solution, supra note 218.
226. See Muchnick, supranote 219, at 236.
227. See id.
228. See id
229. See National Writers Union, Tasini vs. The New York Times: What Does It Mean for
Writers? (last modified Aug. 23, 1997) <http://www. nwu.org//tvt/tvtwrit.htm>.
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structure. No solution will satisfy everyone, but if we use the copyright
institutions which already exist to assist in the transition which the publishing industry must make, and if authors are reasonable in their financial demands, all three parties to copyright (authors, publishers, and users) will enjoy a second helping of the growing financial pie created by
electronic publishing.
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